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Peter Harrison stands accused ofmisusing the notion
ofparsimony. 1 He argues2 that we ought not to attribute
pain states to animals on the grounds that doing so
would be unparsimonious; the most efficient adaptive
mechanisms possible for creatures lacking the ability
to make free, reason-based choices3 would not require
such states, and on "the simplest application of the
theory of natural selection, •>4 we should not attribute to
animals any features which are not required to explain
their adaptive behavior. Rosenfeld objects that this
conclusion implicitly presupposes the excessively
strong claim that organisms always develop the most
effective adaptive mechanisms possible, rather than the
more realistic claim that they will tend to develop the
most effective mechanisms available given the genetic
material they have to work with. On this more
reasonable standard, Rosenfeld argues, it remains an
open possibility that the ability to feel pain (and, I would
add, pleasure) was the bestmechanism available at some
important early stage in evolution, and that evolutionary
theory might thus provide support for the attribution of
pain to animals after all.
I want here to initiate the project of assessing the
case for the prosecution by doing three things: frrst, I
want to try to clarify the nature of the charge itself, by
situating Rosenfeld's attack on Harrison's appeal to
parsimony in this case within the context of a more
fundamental attack on appeals to parsimony in general.

Harrison, "Do Animals Feel Pain?," p. 36.

11

Donald Griffin's works, The Question of Animal
Awareness (New York: Rockefeller Univ. Press, 1981) and
Animal Thinking (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1984),
are directed largely to attacking the anti-mentalist bias that
he saw among ethologists and psychologists.
12

Harrison, "Theodicy and Animal Pain," pp. 88-91.

13
See, for example, Stephen J. Gould and Richard C.
Lewontin, "The Spandrels of San Marcos and the Panglossian
Paradigm: A Critique of the Adaptationist Programme,"
Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B205:581-598,
1979.
14
Griffin, The Question of Animal Awareness, p. 145.
See also Animal Thinking, p. 40.

15

The principle is not true as stated because there are
many features of organisms that have little or no apparent
adaptive value. (1 consider the issue of what proportion of
features are nonadaptive to be an open one.) However, if a
feature has a "cost" or disadvantage to it, or if it is likely to
have had a fairly complex evolutionary development, it is
reasonable to expect some adaptive function to be present
to offset whatever disadvantages it may have now or may
have bad during its development. However, one could still
be mistaken: In some cases, disadvantageous features may
simply be genetically or developmentally linked to other
features that are advantageous.
16
See, for example, Marian Dawkins' argument in
"Minding and Mattering," in Mindwaves, eds. C. Blakemore
and S. Greenfield (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), p. 159.

DISCUSSION

17
Peter Singer, Animal Liberation (New York: Avon,
1990) p. 174.

137

Between the Species

Boonin-Vail: Response

Second, I want to identify and note one feature of an
important response to Rosenfeld's position which might
be made on behalf of Harrison. Third, I want to show
how Rosenfeld's analysis, understood within the context
of the more general critique of parsimony appeals, can
overcome this response.

But why should the fact that the individual selection
hypothesis is more parsimonious count as a reason for
thinking it any more likely to be true? Elliott Sober has
pressed this question in his recent work, and the results
are illuminating: the plausibility of individual over
group sele.ction hypotheses can be justified, but only
by appealing to specific, empirical claims about
population structures? The fact that one hypothesis is
more parsimonious than the other, in and of itself, then,
does nothing to make it more plausible. And Sober
argues that careful attention to other case studies
supports this general conclusion: there is no a priori
justification for preferring parsimonious hypotheses in
general; parsimony lends credibility to hypotheses only
in particular research contexts, and only given certain
auxiliary empirical claims. 8
I take it, then, that Rosenfeld bas accomplished two
things with his critique of Harrison. One is to provide
additional support for Sober's analysis of parsimony in
general by showing that the apparent plausibility of
Harrison's appeal to parsimony in this case depends
crucially on certain empirical assumptions about the
way in which evolution in fact works. The other is to
undermine the plausibility of Harrison's appeal by
revealing that the empirical assumptions which are
required in this case are implausibly strong. When we
say that Harrison is guilty of misusing the notion of
parsimony, then, we should mean two things: that his
appeal to parsimony proceeds as if such appeals have
an a priori, subject-matter neutral justification, which .
they do not, and that the empirical claims which would
be needed to support his appeal to parsimony in this
case are dubious at best It is this second claim that
enables Rosenfeld to rebut Harrison's argument as it
stands, but the ftrst, I want to suggest, may be needed
to overcome a response which might be offered on
Harrison's behalf.

I.
Let me begin with an example of an appeal to
considerations of parsimony taken from another dispute
within evolutionary biology.5 When a group of musk
oxen is attacked by wolves, the oxen form a circle with
adult males on the outside facing the attack and females
and young protected on the inside. Two hypotheses
might be offered to account for the development of this
trait. One is that it is the result ofgroup selection: groups
of oxen compete with each other at avoiding predators,
and those which form protective circles are more
successful at surviving and producing new groups than
are those which do not. The trait thus survives because
it benefits the group (at the expense of some
individuals). A second hypothesis is that the trait is the
result of individual selection: individual oxen compete
with each other at avoiding predators. Some individuals
exhibit the selective trait of standing to fight against
relatively smaller predators while fleeing or hiding from
relatively larger ones, and those who possess this trait
are more successful at surviving and reproducing than
are those who do not. Wolves are typically smaller than
adult male oxen but larger than female and younger
oxen, so when wolves attack, adult male oxen stand
and fight and smaller oxen flee to and bide in the interior
of the circle. The trait thus survives not because it
benefits the group (at the expense of some individuals),
but because it benefits each individual.
Both explanations are consistent with the facts.
Which should be accepted? One could argue, as George
C. Williams did in his important study, Adaptation and
Natural Selection, that the individual selection account
should be accepted on the grounds that lower-level
selection hypotheses are more parsimonious than
higher-level ones. On this view, we would insist that
whenever a trait can be explained in terms of either
individual or group selection, the individual selection
account is always to be preferred. There is no need to
invoke the more complex notion of group selection
when the relatively simpler notion of individual
selection will do. 6
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II.
Let me turn, then, to that response. Rosenfeld has
argued that we should expect evolution to produce in
organisms not the most efficient adaptive mechanisms
possible, but the most efficient mechanisms available
given the material they initially have to work with. It
is possible that the ability to feel pain was the most
efficient adaptive mechanism available at some
important point in early vertebrate evolution, and if
that is so, then parsimony considerations urge us to
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way that I have suggested, he could indeed maintaiq
that the hard-wiring hypothesis remains, at least in some
sense, more parsimonious than the pain states
hypothesis. But at this point, Sober's question would
arise all over again: why should the act that one
hypothesis is more parsimonious than another (in this
revised sense) count as a reason for thinking it any more
likely to be true? And if Sober. is right (and I take
Rosenfeld's argument to provide further support for
Sober's position), then it is true that parsimoniousness
confers plausibility on the hypothesis in this case only
given certain additional empirical assumptions. But
these, surely, will again have to be assumptions about
bow evolution in fact works (i.e., that it works in such
a way that it is more likely to produce mechanisms
exploiting "lower psychical faculties" than mechanisms
exploiting higher ones, even when using the higher ones
would be more efficient) and will thus require the sorts
of further empirical studies which Harrison seems
determined to avoid.
That Harrison's approach encourages us to pay
insufficient attention to facts about animals is also
suggested by an additional feature ofhis writings which
I would like to note in conclusion. In both of the articles
to which Rosenfeld has referred, Harrison presents in
response to the claim that we may infer pain from pain
behavior the claim that the wildebeest" remains silent"
as it is tom apart by predators and that it "dies in
silence.'' 11 Now, I have never actually seen a wildebeest
being torn apart by predators. And I take it that Harrison
hasn't either. But there are people who have. Biologist
Hans Kruuk, for example, bas observed a number of
successful hunts of wildebeest by hyena (Kruuk is an
authority on the hyena). This is how he describes the
wildebeest's behavior after it bas been captured:
"generally speaking the [wildebeest] just stands uttering
loud moaning calls and is torn apart by the hyenas. It
appears to be in a state of shock."l2
It is a well-known feature of a priori arguments
about animals that they are insensitive to empirical
details. We are urged to give more weight to
philosophical considerations of parsimony than to
scientific observations about animals. But I take it that
the upshot of this discussion is that considerations of
parsimony in themselves carry no weight without
auxiliary assumptions which in turn demand empirical
support. To say that Harrison bas misused the notion
of parsimony, then, is in the end to say that he has
made parsimony simple. And it is not.

attribute pain states to animals, rather than to deny
them such states.
But Harrison might try to respond to all of this as
follows: pain states might be the most efficient adaptive
mechanisms that were available to early animals, but
pain states still require appeals to "higher psychical
faculties," while explanations in terms of hard-wiring
appeal to "lower psychical faculties," and the latter are
less complex than the former. So hard-wiring was the
most efficient simple mechanism available, while pain
states were (perhaps) the most efficient complex
mechanism available. But we should prefer the more
parsimonious explanation to the less, and attributing to
animals the most efficient simple mechanism is still
more parsimonious than attributing to them the most
efficient complex mechanism.9
Notice that this reply would allow Harrison to deny
Rosenfeld's claim that the rejection of animal pain could
be salvaged only by appealing to further empirical
studies. 10 On this view, it wouldn't matter what
neurophysiologists and others uncovered about the
relative merits of conscious and nonconscious ailllptive
mechanisms. Hard-wired mechanisms would remain the
most efficient available lower-order adaptation, and on
this view would be more parsimoniously inferred than
any higher-order adaptation no matter how efficient.
This assessment would be guaranteed by parsimony in
the same way that, on Williams' account of natural
selection, an explanation of some particular trait in terms
of individual selection would always be preferred to an
explanation in terms of group selection, even if the
hypothesized process ofselection at the individual level
were far more cumbersome than the hypothesized
process of selection at the group level. In both cases,
no amount of empirical evidence would be able to
establish the superiority of the higher-level hypothesis
(pain in explaining animals, group selection in
explaining trait survival), because the lower-level one
would be taken as preferable on essentially a priori
grounds.

III.
But if we take Rosenfeld's critique of Harrison's
position as underwriting a more fundamental criticism
of a priori appeals to parsimony in general, then
Harrison cannot escape the force of Rosenfeld's attack
on one parsimony claim simply by hiding behind
another. If Harrison were to revise his position in the
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justification" (p. 90). The problem of phylogenetic inference
in particular and Sober's analysis of parsimony in general are
both explored in more detail in Sober, Reconstructing the Past:
Parsimony, Evolution, and Inference (Cambridge: MIT Press,
1988).
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